



The Emperor’s New Code? Time to Re-Evaluate the
Nature of Stewardship Engagement Under the UK’s
Stewardship Code
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John Kingman’s review of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) doubted the effectiveness of
the UK’s Stewardship Code in encouraging informed and engaged stewardship by institutional
investors of the companies in which they invest (issuers). Accordingly, the FRC updated the
Stewardship Code in 2020 in a final bid to prove its effectiveness and relevance, and, in particular,
to enhance issuer-specific engagement by institutional investors. The update has enhanced the
reach and substance of the Code. However, the legal, regulatory, contractual and competitive
environment in which institutional investors exist will constantly forestall soft-law attempts to
foster greater issuer-specific engagement, a point perhaps tacitly acknowledged by the 2020
Stewardship Code with its wider scope.Instead, in relation to engagement,stewardship disclosure
should focus on the types of engagement that institutional investors are motivated to exercise in
practice, such as engagement in response to hedge fund activism, and engagement on systemic
risks.
INTRODUCTION
‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’1 tells the classic tale of an emperor who receives a
set of ‘clothes’, described by deceitful weavers as invisible to the unworthy.The
emperor, not wishing to appear underserving, proceeds to ‘wear’ an outfit that
does not exist. In 2020, the UK’s Stewardship Code, on its tenth anniversary,
was also presented with a sartorial gift,with the Code substantively updated and
expanded by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in an attempt to increase
the effectiveness with which shareholders engage with the companies in which
they are invested (issuers).2 This article discusses whether the new version of
the Stewardship Code will in fact encourage the types of engagement coveted
by the FRC, or whether, in repeating the shortcomings of previous versions of
the Code, it merely pulls the wool over the emperor’s eyes.
The word ‘stewardship’ stems from the old English term for a housekeeper,
or, more appropriately in the context of this article, someone who looks after
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2 FRC,The UK Stewardship Code 2020 (London: FRC, 2020) (2020 Code).
© 2021 The Authors. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 00(0)MLR1–32
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License,which permits use,distribution and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Stewardship Engagement Under the UK Stewardship Code
the house.3 Stepping into contemporary times, in the finance world, steward-
ship has been used to define the concept that those who look after the assets of
others, should act as good ‘stewards’ of those assets.4 Accordingly, institutional
asset owners, such as pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds and
other collective investment vehicles, which invest funds on the behalf of ‘ben-
eficiaries’, should take care of those funds and of the assets and companies in
which those funds are invested. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the
ideal of investor ‘stewardship’ took a grip, with the publication of the influen-
tial ‘Walker Review’.5 The supposition6 was that the banks,which failed during
the financial crisis, had taken unwarranted risks to enhance short-term profits,
which could have been attenuated if,as listed entities,their institutional investors
had proactively monitored or ‘stewarded’ their actions and strategies. After all,
the banks, in which asset owners invested, represented the assets of the benefi-
ciaries which the asset owners had been tasked to steward. In 2010, the FRC
published the UK’s Stewardship Code,7 which outlined a number of principles
to which ‘institutional investors’ should adhere.8 Institutional investors, which
hold nearly 80 per cent of UK-listed shares,9 were denoted to be asset owners,
as described above, and the asset managers who manage assets on behalf of their
‘clients’, the asset owners.10 The principles encouraged institutional investors
to monitor and engage with the boards of issuers, and to disclose their policies
on stewardship and voting.
Even though the Code was up-dated in 2012, a great deal of scepticism has
been levelled at its effectiveness over the years,11 culminating in the scathing
criticism of the independent ‘Kingman Review’,12 which, in 2018, gener-
ally reviewed the effectiveness and role of the FRC.13 The Kingman Review
3 ‘Stewardship’derives from the old English words, stig (‘house hall’) and weard (‘ward’) (J.Pearsall
(ed),Concise Oxford Dictionary Tenth Edition (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
4 An example of a relevant definition: ‘Stewardship is the “responsible and wholehearted manage-
ment of entrusted assets so as to pass them on in better condition”.’ (O. Hwee and M. Goyder
(eds),Entrusted: Stewardship for Responsible Wealth Creation (Singapore:World Scientific, 2020) 21.
5 D. Walker, A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: Final
recommendations (London: HM Treasury, 2009) (Walker Review).
6 ibid, 72.
7 FRC,The UK Stewardship Code (London: FRC, 2010) (Stewardship Code 2010).
8 Service providers to those institutional investors were also encouraged to ‘disclose how they
carry out the wishes of their clients by applying the principles of the Code that are relevant to
their activities’ (ibid, 2).
9 If individuals, charities and public sector bodies are excluded, UK and global institutions hold
the remainder of UK equities, amounting to 77.77 per cent of UK-listed shares (Calculated
using data from: Office for National Statistics (ONS), ‘Ownership of UK quoted shares: 2018’
(January 2020)).
10 Stewardship Code 2010, n 7 above, 2.
11 For example Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) Committee Third Report of Session 2013-
14, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (London: BIS, 2013)
37; A. Reisberg, ‘The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere’ (2015) 15 JCLS 217;
D. Arsalidou, ‘Shareholders and Corporate Scrutiny: The Role of the UK Stewardship Code’
(2012) 3 ECFR 342, 355-371.
12 J. Kingman, Independent Review of the Financial Reporting Council (London: DBEIS, 2018) (King-
man Review).
13 In accordance with the Kingman Review’s recommendations (ibid,19), the FRCwill be replaced
by the Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority, a new independent regulator established
on a statutory footing.
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castigated the Stewardship Code’s lack of efficacy in encouraging informed and
engaged stewardship of issuers by UK-investors,14 and suggested that the Code
acted as a driver of boilerplate reporting due to the FRC focusing on the qual-
ity of policy statements by institutional investors, rather than the outcomes and
effectiveness of stewardship in practice.15 Ominously, the review asserted that if
a revised Code could not more clearly differentiate excellence in stewardship,
serious consideration should be given to its abolition.16
Although the broader concept of stewardship embraces a vast array of poten-
tial actions, this article will focus on ‘engagement’, being the centre of attention
of both the Walker and Kingman Reviews. The clear recommendation of the
Walker Review was that institutional investors should proactively engage with
the boards of their individual investee companies to pre-emptively identify and
resolve strategic problems, and ensure that those companies are managed suc-
cessfully – what will, in this article, be termed ‘issuer-specific engagement’.
Successive editions of the Stewardship Code encouraged issuer-specific en-
gagement as the primary method of effective stewardship,17 and the Kingman
Review alluded to an absence of meaningful engagement by institutional in-
vestors.18 Issuer-specific engagement has been a cornerstone of the stewardship
movement, but, as will be discussed, it may be time to take a step back to de-
termine what types of engagement are most likely to occur, and, indeed, what
types of engagement are propitious.
When it comes to engagement, with the publication of the UK Steward-
ship Code 202019 (the 2020 Code), the FRC has kicked open the swing-doors
to last chance saloon. The FRC has endeavoured to rectify flaws in the pre-
vious version of the Code, including greater recognition that the interests of
beneficiaries and clients may be served by broadening the concept of steward-
ship to more than issuer-specific engagement, but in tribute to the Walker and
Kingman Reviews, issuer-specific engagement is still front-and-centre. In this
article, it will be discussed that although the 2020 Code has improved upon
previous deficiencies, the traditional premise of investor engagement on issuer-
specific matters as first envisaged by the Walker Review is fundamentally fated
to fail. The 2020 Code’s wider ambit beyond issuer-specific engagement is a
tacit admission that investor engagement may not be achievable in the manner
advocated by the Walker and Kingman Reviews, and a broader scope has been
adopted in an attempt to salvage the Code’s relevance.That broader scope may,
in fact, lay the foundations for future regulatory policy that focuses on the types
of engagement that take place in practice, rather than the traditional form of
issuer-specific engagement as advocated by previous versions of the Steward-
ship Code. This article will commence with a brief overview of the material
changes to the Stewardship Code introduced by the 2020 Code, followed by a
description of the legal, regulatory,contractual and commercial duties of institu-




17 nn 26-28 below, and accompanying text.
18 nn 14-16 above, and accompanying text.
19 n 2 above.
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to promote engagement.The propensity for asset owners and asset managers to
exercise issuer-specific engagement will be analysed, and it will be concluded
that the principle type of issuer-specific engagement that will occur in practice
is that exercised by offensive activists such as hedge funds – a sub-set of institu-
tional investors that are not targeted by, and are not generally signatories to, the
Stewardship Code.As such, the Stewardship Code should, instead, focus on the
dynamic between such offensive activists and those institutional investors more
likely to become signatories to the Stewardship Code. Finally, the prospects for
the broader scope of the 2020 Code to promote engagement of another kind
which relates to engagement across multiple issuers or across an industry as a
whole – categorised in this article as holistic-risk engagement – will be deter-
mined,and the consequences of that insight for the future of stewardship-related
regulation will be evaluated.However,with respect to traditional issuer-specific
engagement, it is time to leave that ideology in the tumbleweed.
THE 2020 CODE – WHAT HAS CHANGED?
Although it is not intended that a detailed retrace of the Stewardship Code’s
history be reproduced here,20 in this section, a brief outline of the evolution
of the Code and the changes introduced by its 2020 incarnation are presented,
with a view to discerning whether there has been any palpable shift in the
Code’s tone which could inform the discussions in the remainder of this article.
The FRC first commenced administering the Stewardship Code in 2010, after
appropriating an existing code of responsibilities developed by a representative
body for institutional investors.21 The Code was purely voluntary,only applying
to those institutional investors who signed-up to the Code,22 and constituted
seven principles against which institutional investors were expected to disclose
their compliance or explain their reasons for deviation (‘comply-or-explain’).23
As such, it represented the softest of soft-law.Although the 2010 version of the
20 For a history see Arsalidou, n 11 above, 348-352; B. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles
Heel’ (2010) 73 MLR 1004,1008-1013; I.Chiu and D.Katelouzou, ‘From Shareholder Steward-
ship to Shareholder Duties: Is the Time Ripe?’ in H.Birkmose (ed),Shareholders’Duties (Alphen
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2016) 131, 134-135; P. Davies, ‘The UK Stewardship
Code 2010-2020: From Saving the Company to Saving the Planet?’ ECGI Working Paper No
506/2020 1, 4.
21 The Stewardship Code 2010, n 7 above, replicated a code that had been developed by the Insti-
tutional Shareholders Committee (ISC), the ‘Code of Responsibilities of Institutional Investors’,
which itself was based upon the long-running ‘Statement of Principles of Shareholder Engage-
ment’.
22 There is some compunction, though,on UK-based asset managers,which must be authorised by
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to provide investment management services (Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), ss 19 and 22), to sign-up to the Stewardship
Code. As a condition of authorisation, either the nature of the asset manager’s commitment to
the Stewardship Code, or an alternative investment strategy, must be disclosed (FCA’s Conduct
of Business Sourcebook (COBS), 2.2.3R).
23 Stewardship Code 2010, n 7 above, 1. The Code continued in the tradition of the comply-or-
explain regime that applies to the UK’s Corporate Governance Code, n 34 below, which was
pioneered in 1992 in the ‘Cadbury Code’ (A. Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee and Co, 1992) 57).
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Code did not include a definition of ‘stewardship’per se, it did set out the aims of
the Code, being, ‘to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional
investors and companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders
and the efficient exercise of governance responsibilities’.24 The seven principles
could be broadly delineated into ‘reporting’ and ‘intervention’. The three ‘re-
porting’ based principles required disclosure of stewardship policy, voting and
stewardship activity, and policy on management of conflicts of interest.25 The
‘intervention’ based principles required disclosures that it was hoped would, as
implored by the Walker Review, encourage issuer-specific engagement – insti-
tutional investors were required to, or explain why they did not, monitor their
investee companies, escalate their stewardship activities in accordance with clear
guidelines, act collectively with other investors where appropriate, and have a
clear policy on voting in those investee companies.26 In 2012, hot-off the back
of criticism by the Kay Review27 that listed companies and the equity markets
in which they issued capital were overly preoccupied with short-term metrics,
the Code was updated, and the aims were subtly revised: ‘Stewardship aims to
promote the long term success of companies in such a way that the ultimate
providers of capital also prosper.’28 Although the aims no longer specifically ref-
erenced engagement, only marginal revisions were made to the Principles and
Guidance, which therefore remained focused on issuer-specific engagement.
No further changes were made to the Code until 2020. The 2020 Code is
still a voluntary code which only applies to those who resolve to become sig-
natories, although, as with previous versions, there is some compunction29 on
UK-based asset managers to sign-up to the Code.30 The 2020 Code, though,
takes a stricter modus than the Code’s previous ‘comply-or-explain’ approach.
Now signatories must apply the principles and explain how they have done so
(‘apply-and-explain’).31 The 2020 Code also recognises the differing roles of
asset owners and asset managers, with responsibilities of asset owners linked to
the interests of beneficiaries, and the responsibilities of asset managers linked to
the interests of their clients, the asset owners. Service providers are covered by
a separate set of scaled-back principles. The Code also now notionally covers
the stewardship of non-equity investments, although only very little detail is
24 Stewardship Code 2010, n 7 above, 1.
25 ibid, 5, Principles 1, 2, and 7.
26 ibid, 5, Principles 3, 4, 5 and 6.
27 J. Kay, The Kay Review of the UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making: Final Report
(London: BIS, 2012). The Kay Review also noted that asset managers could ‘contribute more
to the performance of British business … through greater involvement with the companies in
which they invest’, and that asset managers should have greater incentives to engagement. The
Kay Review’s proposals to reduce the costs of engagement through collective action led to the
formation of the Investor Forum ibid, 50 (see n 126 below, and accompanying text).
28 FRC,The UK Stewardship Code (London: FRC, 2012) 1.
29 n 22 above.
30 Unsurprisingly, therefore, as of the end of 2019, nearly two-thirds of the signatories to the Stew-
ardship Code were asset managers – 178 asset managers, 105 asset owners (some of whom
provide asset management services ‘in-house’), and 12 service providers (FRC, ‘Tiering of
2012 Stewardship Code Signatories’ at https://www.frc.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code/
uk-stewardship-code-statements). All URLs were last accessed on 14 October 2020 unless oth-
erwise stated.
31 2020 Code, n 2 above, 4.
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provided.32 Perhaps the most notable change is that the ‘Guidance’ formula-
tion adopted by previous versions has been abandoned in favour of ‘Reporting
Expectations’. The Reporting Expectations emphasise that signatories, rather
than merely summarising their policies in relation to each of the principles as
required under previous versions of the Code, must provide examples of how
they have applied the principles in practice (‘activities’) and how those activities
have contributed to effective conclusions (‘outcomes’).
The structural changes to the 2020 Code make it abundantly apparent as to
what the FRC was intending to achieve. The aspiration is that signatories will
no longer be able to provide vacuous disclosures against broad-based princi-
ples that do not inform as to their real-world behaviour, and, instead, will im-
prove the quality, substance and meaningfulness of their disclosures. Although
the 2020 Code steers signatories to better quality disclosure, it foregoes a ‘best
practice approach’. The draft version of the Code that pre-empted the 2020
Code proposed that signatories should ‘apply-and-explain’ against the Princi-
ples and ‘comply-or-explain’ against best practice provisions,33 mirroring the
approach taken by the UK Corporate Governance Code (UK CGC).34 When
best practice norms are not prevalent in the market place, there is value in the
principle/provision comply-or-explain approach to ingrain those best prac-
tices.35 In fact, theWalker Review was optimistic that a stewardship code would
lead to best practice being promoted throughout the institutional investor com-
munity,36 and the Kay Review recommended the adoption of ‘good practice’
statements by asset owners and asset managers.37 With the FRC determining
not to delineate best practice, presumably, the objective is that the market will
drive the development of best practice norms, consequent to asset managers
disclosing to asset owners how they are applying stewardship in the best inter-
ests of the asset owners, and asset owners disclosing to beneficiaries how they
are developing stewardship policies, and appointing and monitoring asset man-
agers to apply those policies, in the interests of beneficiaries.The goal is that by
bolstering reporting through disclosure of activities and outcomes, beneficia-
ries and clients will be given more coherent information as to how institutional
owners are exercising stewardship in practice, and a virtuous circle will develop
whereunder clients and beneficiaries select asset managers and asset owners, re-
spectively, based upon their disclosure of consistent engagement with issuers,
which in turn encourages those asset managers and asset owners to exercise
more and better engagement. However, with respect to encouraging issuer-
specific engagement, the entire approach assumes that such engagement is in
the best interests of beneficiaries and clients, and, therefore, beneficiaries and
32 ibid, 6.
33 FRC, Proposed Revision to the UK Stewardship Code: Annex A – Revised UK Stewardship Code
(London: FRC, 2019) 3.
34 FRC,The UK Corporate Governance Code (London:FRC,2018).The provisions of the UK CGC
outline corporate governance best practice for companies listed on the premium-tier of theMain
Market of the London Stock Exchange (premium-listed companies).
35 B. Reddy, ‘Thinking Outside the Box – Eliminating the Perniciousness of Box-Ticking in the
New Corporate Governance Code’ (2019) 82 MLR 692, 705.
36 Walker Review, n 5 above, 83.
37 Kay Review, n 27 above, 48.
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clients will attach weight to the level of issuer-specific engagement exercised
by asset owners and asset managers, which, as discussed further in this article,38
are fundamentally flawed assumptions.
Beyond structural changes, the FRC was intent on ensuring that the 2020
Code would constitute more than the merely superficial changes made between
2010 and 2012, and, therefore, the underlying premise of the Code and the
substance of the Code’s Principles were also fundamentally updated. The 2020
Code has, for the first time, provided a definition of ‘stewardship’: ‘Stewardship
is the responsible allocation,management and oversight of capital to create long-
term value for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for the
economy,the environment and society.’39 The definition evidences another sub-
tle shift in the Code’s tone,with,now,a much clearer emphasis on the long-term
interests of clients and beneficiaries. Whereas the aims of previous versions of
the Code,outlined above,were premised on issuer-specific engagement,with an
underlying assumption that issuer-specific engagement by institutional investors
will improve the prospects of issuers in a manner that will benefit the ultimate
beneficiaries of asset owners, the more expansive definition in the 2020 Code
recognises that simple issuer-specific engagement is not the only way to exercise
‘good’ stewardship, and that, perhaps, issuer-specific engagement may, in some
instances,be superseded by other actions that ‘create long-term value for clients
and beneficiaries.’ The number of Principles has been extended to 12 (along
with a scaled-back list of six Principles applicable to service providers), divided
into four categories. The first category is entitled ‘purpose and governance’40
and urges institutional investors to ensure that their internal purpose, incentives
and governance mechanisms support their stewardship responsibilities. Certain
Principles now seemingly go beyond simple issuer-specific engagement, and,
of note, the 2020 Code provides that signatories should ‘identify and respond
to market-wide and systemic risks to promote a well-functioning financial sys-
tem’.41 The second category is ‘investment approach’,42 the principles of which
require institutional investors to align their stewardship activities with the needs
of their beneficiaries (in the case of asset owners) and clients (in the case of asset
managers), and ensure that those parties acting on their behalf provide services
in accordance with the stewardship approach of the underlying institutional in-
vestor. Further emphasising the broader nature of the 2020 Code, signatories
are required to ‘systematically integrate stewardship and investment, including
material environmental, social and governance issues,and climate change, to ful-
fil their responsibilities.’43 Although environmental and social (ES) issues were
referenced in the 201044 and 201245 versions of the Code, they were named as
examples of matters on which institutional investors should intervene in relation
38 See ‘Passive investment’ and ‘Active investment’ in the section ‘Will Issuer-Specific Engagement
be Promoted by the 2020 Code’ below.
39 2020 Code, n 2 above, 4.
40 ibid, Principles 1-5.
41 ibid, Principle 4.
42 ibid, Principles 6-8.
43 ibid, Principle 7.
44 Stewardship Code 2010, n 7 above, 7 (Guidance to Principle 4).
45 Stewardship Code 2012, n 28 above, 8 (Guidance to Principle 4).
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to issuer-specific engagement, whereas, under the 2020 Code, environmental,
social and governance (ESG) issues have become more pervasive in relation to
investment policy (including integration into holding and exit decisions46).The
third category is ‘engagement’47 and mirrors the issuer-specific engagement ex-
tolled by previous versions of the Code,with encouragement of institutional in-
vestors to engage with issuers, collaborate with other institutional investors, and
escalate stewardship activities where necessary. The final category of ‘exercis-
ing rights and responsibilities’48 again reflects issuer-specific engagement, prin-
cipally relating to the exercise of votes by institutional investors in issuers, and
the policies and considerations influencing those decisions.Therefore, although
issuer-specific engagement is still the central tenet to the Stewardship Code,
the Code now embraces a wider,more progressive approach.How that broader
scope accords with engagement will be discussed in the final part of this article.49
The remainder of this article focuses specifically on engagement, given that,
post-Kingman Review, the standard by which the effectiveness of the 2020
Code will be judged is the extent to which it improves institutional investor
engagement with issuers. In the next part of this article, the legal, regulatory,
contractual and commercial duties of institutional investors to their clients and
beneficiaries will be outlined, since those duties will be critical to evaluating the
prospects for the 2020 Code to encourage issuer-specific,or other, engagement.
DUTIES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
If the principal objective of the Stewardship Code is to encourage greater issuer-
specific engagement, the 2020 Code could simply specify that institutional
investors should proactively engage with issuers to ensure that their business
strategies are conducted in a manner conducive to the long-term success of
those companies. This would resonate with the Walker Review which berated
investors for not engaging in a manner to improve the long-term health of is-
suers, and the Kay Review which bemoaned the short-termism of issuers and
the capital markets in general.50 However, instead, as discussed above,51 the def-
inition of ‘stewardship’ in the 2020 Code ties the concept of ‘stewardship’ to
creating ‘long-term value for clients and beneficiaries’.52 Even the 2012 version
of the Code,which more expressly highlighted the need to promote the long-
term success of companies, also noted that stewardship should be conducted in
a manner that benefits the ultimate providers of capital.53 To understand the
FRC’s approach, and prior to assessing the propensity for the Code to promote
issuer-specific engagement, it is apposite to briefly outline the duties that are
in fact owed by institutional investors. A voluntary, soft-law code cannot ask
46 2020 Code, n 2 above, Principle 7 – Reporting Expectations: Context.
47 ibid, Principles 9-11.
48 ibid, Principle 12.
49 See ‘The Broader Scope of the 2020 Code and Holistic-Risk Engagement’ below.
50 Walker Review, n 5 above, 72; Kay Review, n 27 above, 14-21.
51 n 39 above, and accompanying text.
52 2020 Code, n 2 above, 4.
53 n 28 above, 1, and accompanying text.
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institutional investors to take any actions which are contrary to the duties that
they owe.
Institutional investors under the Stewardship Code are asset owners and asset
managers.54 Asset owners collate funds from beneficiaries with a view to invest-
ing those funds on their behalf. In turn, asset owners appoint asset managers to
manage (and invest) those funds. Starting with the duties of asset managers, an
asset manager will owe duties to the asset owner whose funds it is managing. It
has been suggested the duty is fiduciary in nature,55 but even absent a fiduciary
duty, contractual duties (which can supersede fiduciary duties56) will be owed
in accordance with the investment mandate specified in the asset management
contract.57 UK-based asset managers, which are the only asset managers with
any regulatory compunction to sign-up to the Code,58 must also be authorised
by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to provide investment management
services,which entails compliance with the FCA’s Conduct of Business Source-
book (COBS).59 COBS 2.1.1R requires such asset managers to act in the best
interests of their clients (the asset owners).60 Furthermore, in the context of the
asset management of UK trust-based occupational pension schemes, an asset
manager must exercise its investment management powers in the best interests
of the underlying beneficiaries of the pension scheme.61 The position in relation
to the duties of asset owners is a little less certain since not all asset owners (unless
they also provide asset management services62) are regulated by the FCA.How-
ever,with respect to pension funds,which form the vast majority of asset owner
signatories to the Stewardship Code,63 duties will be owed to beneficiaries from
a legal or regulatory perspective. For trust-based pension schemes, trust law will
intervene, and trustees will owe fiduciary duties to beneficiaries to act in their
interests.64 Although fiduciary duties are unlikely to apply to contractual-based
pension schemes,65 they must still be operated in the interests of their beneficia-
ries from a regulatory perspective - the provider of a contractual-based pension
scheme must establish an independent governance committee66 which must act
54 n 10 above, and accompanying text.
55 Obiter dicta by Moore-Bick LJ in Diamantides v JP Morgan Chase Bank [2005] EWCA Civ 1612
at [27]; Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries: A Consultation Paper Con-
sultation Paper No 215 (2013) 197.
56 Law Commission (2013), ibid, 174.
57 I.Chiu, ‘Turning Institutional Investors into “Stewards”:Exploring the Meaning and Objectives
of “Stewardship”’ (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 443, 448.,
58 n 22 above.
59 ibid.
60 In relation to consumers, it should be noted that the FCA is considering whether to strengthen
and clarify the duties owed by regulated firms (FCA, ‘A duty of care and potential alternative
approaches: summary of responses and next steps’ Feedback Statement FS19/2, April 2019, 18).
61 The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005, reg 4(2).
62 In relation to ‘in-house’ asset management, see n 84 below, and accompanying text.
63 As of the end of 2019, of the 105 asset owners that had signed-up to the Stewardship Code,
82 of them were pension funds or amalgamations of multiple pension funds (discerned from an
author analysis of FRC, ‘Tiering of 2012 Stewardship Code Signatories’ n 30 above).
64 A.Tilba and A.Reisberg, ‘Fiduciary Duty under the Microscope:Stewardship and the Spectrum
of Pension Fund Engagement’ (2019) 82MLR 456,466-469.Even outside of the pensions realm,
asset owners that constitute trust-based relationships will owe similar duties to beneficiaries.
65 Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries Law Com No 350 (2014) 159.
66 COBS 19.5.2R.
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solely in the interests of policyholders.67 Therefore, a significant proportion of
the actors that are covered by the Stewardship Code are subject to legal or reg-
ulatory duties owed to clients and/or beneficiaries.Even for the handful of asset
owner signatories to the Stewardship Code that are neither trust-based nor pen-
sion funds, so not subject to fiduciary or regulatory duties, for some, contractual
duties will apply,68 and for those to which such contractual duties have not been
expressly delineated, from a commercial perspective, the relevant asset owners
will swiftly be out of business if they do not act in the interests of beneficiaries.
With what, however, should the interests of beneficiaries and clients be
equated? It seems that, in most cases, the answer will be the financial inter-
ests of those beneficiaries and clients. Taking trust-based pension funds as an
example, the Law Commission clarified the nature of the fiduciary duties owed
by trustees to beneficiaries, and it was confirmed that trustees could take into
account considerations that are not purely financial in their nature on a permis-
sive basis, but only to the extent that such considerations are financially material
to the value of the relevant portfolio.69 That may sound like a tautology, and, in
many respects, it is, but the diktat clarified that although trustees should gener-
ally prioritise the financial interests of beneficiaries, they should also be aware
that certain considerations, such as ES issues, that may not obviously be financial
in nature, can have an impact on the long-term financial value of a portfolio. In
relation to purely non-financial considerations, the Law Commission expressed:
‘trustees should not accept a lower return from an investment simply because
it will improve members’ quality of life’.70 The logic can also be extended to
outside the trust-based arena, since, as discussed above, it is likely that legal, reg-
ulatory or contractual duties will also be owed by asset managers and non-trust
asset owners,71 and, by analogy, those interests will generally be envisaged to be
financial in nature.72 Additionally, with an expectation that funds will be held
and managed to maximise financial returns, asset owners and asset managers
will be under commercial pressure to generate valuable returns.
The Law Commission did,however, identify a specific scenario where purely
non-financial issues could be prioritised over the financial interests of benefi-
ciaries by trust-based pension schemes; this being where the trustees have good
reason to believe that scheme members share the relevant concerns (so long
as the decision in question does not risk significant financial detriment to the
fund).73 Therefore, taking engagement, if beneficiaries see value in widespread
issuer-specific engagement (perhaps as a ‘greater good’), even if such a
67 COBS 19.5.5R(1).
68 For example some investment funds, particularly if they target sophisticated investors, will con-
tractually agree with beneficiaries to deal with funds in the interests of those beneficiaries and
subject to specific investment parameters.
69 Law Commission (2013), n 55 above, 151; Law Commission (2014), n 65 above, 101.
70 Law Commission (2013), ibid, 157.
71 nn 55-68, and accompanying text.
72 For example large asset managers often disclose that they will support ESG-related proposals
only to the extent that they are beneficial to share value or shareholder interests (C. Griffin,
‘Environmental and Social Voting at Index Funds’ (2020) 1,11-14 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3542081; S. Griffith, ‘Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation on Mutual Fund
Voting Authority’ (2019) 1, 41 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404298).
73 Law Commission (2014), n 65 above, 118.
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strategy will generate lesser financial returns, the trustees may make decisions
based upon those preferences.Similarly,with respect to non-trust-based funds,as
long as the relevant contractual mandate is clear as to the wishes of beneficiaries
or clients, the relevant asset owner or asset manager will be safe in pursuing those
mandates. In a nod to the Law Commission’s elucidation, the 2020 Code re-
quires disclosure as to how institutional investors have sought beneficiaries’ and
clients’ views, and how they have taken those views into account in their invest-
ment approach.74 However,for an institutional investor,seeking and acting upon
such views is mired in peril. For an asset owner, attempting to seek the views of
potentially thousands of beneficiaries is clearly impractical beyond requesting
answers to broad generic questionnaires which are unlikely to collate detailed
views,or be completed by all addressees.75 In any case, it is implausible that pref-
erences amongst beneficiaries will be clear-cut, and, in reality, certain beneficia-
ries may well have a preference for issuer-specific engagement, but others will
covet pure financial returns and,accordingly,will desire that the asset owner (and
by extension, asset manager) follows a strategy that prioritises financial value.76
In such cases, for trust-based pensions, the Law Commission postulated that the
Courts will likely expect trustees to give precedence to financial factors.77
The Law Commission acknowledged, however, that greater clarity exists
for specialist funds where the preferences of beneficiaries could more easily
be presumed.78 ESG or socially responsible investment specialist funds, which
only invest in line with ESG- or sustainability-friendly policies, have become
increasingly popular in recent years,79 and, potentially more pertinent in the
context of issuer-specific engagement, ‘stewardship funds’ have also emerged.
Specialist funds can take decisions aligned with the underlying aims of the fund,
even if those decisions do not maximise the financial value of the portfolio,
since the views of the beneficiaries can be presumed by their positive decision
to invest in a fund exhibiting those specialist characteristics. In terms of en-
gagement, though, the handful of aforementioned specialist ‘stewardship funds’
74 2020 Code, n 2 above, Principle 6 – Reporting Expectations: ‘Activity’ and ‘Outcome’.
75 It has been noted that index funds do not make efforts to seek beneficiaries’views (C.Griffin,‘We
Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants’ (2019) 1, 3 and 18 at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3365222).Some have suggested that a potential solution to stewardship issues
would be to give beneficiaries ‘pass-through’ voting rights (for example J. Fisch, ‘The Uncertain
Stewardship Potential of Index Funds’ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No 490/2020 (2020)
101, 120-125; Griffin (2019), ibid, 33; Griffin (2020), n 72 above, 35). UK legislation already
contemplates the implementation of such schemes (Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), s 145),
but it would entail extreme administrative issues, and one could be sceptical as to whether
beneficiaries will regularly exercise those rights.
76 By analogy to ES issues, see Griffin (2019), ibid, 13. The propensity for retail investors to sup-
port environmental over financial considerations, for example, may be overstated (Fisch, ibid,
119), highlighting the uncertainties that asset owners and asset managers face in ascertaining
beneficiary preference.
77 Law Commission (2014), n 65 above, 121.
78 ibid, 126.The Law Commission specifically referenced funds set-up by religious groups, charities
or political organisations.
79 M. Lipton, ‘Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2018’ Harvard Law School Forum on
Corporate Governance,30 November 2017;Griffin (2020),n 72 above,15;D.Katelouzou and A.
Klettner, ‘Sustainable Finance and Stewardship:Unlocking Stewardship’s Sustainability Potential’
(2020) 1, 14 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578447.
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that have emerged are essentially little more than sustainability or ESG-focused
investments, rather than issuer-specific engagement funds.80 In any case, it is
outside of the scope of this article to assess the levels of engagement exercised
by specialist funds,which will occur, or not, outside of any encouragement un-
der the Stewardship Code. Future research could focus on whether disclosure
requirements for specialist funds should be more prescriptive than those for
general funds, since the underlying investors in those funds are providing their
capital on the basis that it will be employed in a specific manner disconnected
from purely maximising financial returns,81 and outside of the UK, the EU has
taken up the baton in requiring, on a mandatory basis, more robust disclosures
by specialist sustainability-related funds.82
In summary, outside of specialist funds, asset owners and asset managers will
be required to, or will be under commercial pressure to, act in a manner that
maximises the financial value of the relevant portfolio. Even in relation to spe-
cialist funds, beneficiaries are investing in order to make a return, and, therefore,
notwithstanding a focus on investments that further the non-financial specialist
interests of the fund’s beneficiaries, it will be incumbent on the asset owners
and asset managers of those funds to generate positive returns.Therefore,when
ascertaining the propensity for institutional investors to exercise issuer-specific
engagement, crucial considerations will be whether such engagement is in the
financial interests of the underlying beneficiaries, and in the commercial inter-
ests of those institutional investors. It is discussed in the next section, though,
that, as with the emperor’s new clothes, an assumption that issuer-specific en-
gagement will be conducive to those financial and commercial interests is the
Stewardship’s Code’s invisible cloak.
80 For example Aviva’s Stewardship Funds at https://www.aviva.co.uk/retirement/fund-centre/
stewardship/; Baillie Gifford Global Stewardship Fund at https://www.bailliegifford.com/en/
uk/institutional-investor/funds/global-stewardship-fund/.
81 Of particular note, US research has levied scepticism that specialist ESG-funds operate any dif-
ferently from generalist funds, particularly when managed by the same asset manager, with it
being found that ESG-funds often fail to vote in accordance with sustainability goals (Griffin
(2019), n 75 above, 13), and, in relation to the large asset managers, ESG-specialist funds usually
vote in line with other generalist funds managed by the same asset manager (L. Strine, ‘Who
Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and
Our Strange Corporate Governance System’ (2017) 126 YLJ 1870, 1914; Griffin (2020), n 72
above, 25).They are also often opaque and misleading as to how ESG-issues manifest themselves
in investment, engagement and voting decisions (Griffin (2020), ibid, 15, 30 and 32).
82 The EU has published regulations which require certain ‘financial market participants’ to disclose
specific information about products which promote ES-characteristics or which have objectives
related to positive impacts on the environment and society (Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability-related dis-
closures in the financial services sector, Arts 8-11),mainly applicable in Member States from 10
March 2021 (ibid, Art 20). ‘Financial market participants’ are, broadly, asset managers, insurance
companies and occupational pension schemes (ibid, Art 2). Required disclosures include full
details of the relevant characteristics or objectives, information on any benchmarks used, how
characteristics or objectives are met (to the extent no benchmarks are used), and the method-
ologies used to assess and measure performance against the relevant characteristics or objectives.
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WILL ISSUER-SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT BE PROMOTED BY THE
2020 CODE
Having established that asset owners and asset managers will generally, as a mat-
ter of legal, regulatory or contractual duties, or as a matter of commercial prac-
ticality, act in the financial interests of beneficiaries and clients, respectively, in
this section, it will be discussed whether acting in those interests will manifest
itself in the issuer-specific engagement as advocated by the Walker and King-
man Reviews, and as encouraged by the 2020 Code. In particular, any urgings
by a code that is applied on a soft-law basis to engage with companies will not
be heeded if such actions clash with the relevant duties owed,83 and, therefore,
if issuer-specific engagement is contrary to those duties, the 2020 Code may
have already lost before it has even played the game.
Asset owners either conduct investment management directly (in which case
‘asset management’ functions are performed in-house) or delegate the functions
to asset managers.Therefore, in terms of engagement, asset management is crit-
ical, since engagement with issuers will be conducted by internal or external
asset managers.84 An asset owner acting in the interests of its beneficiaries, will
be concerned to ensure that the asset manager it employs (internally or exter-
nally) conducts itself in a manner that will ultimately be in the interests of the
asset owner’s beneficiaries. Therefore, it is imperative to assess the strategies of
asset managers, and whether issuer-specific engagement can be incorporated
into those strategies in the interests of beneficiaries. There are three main asset
management strategies to be considered – passive investment, active investment
and offensive activist investment.
Passive investment
The definition of ‘passive investment’ can vary, but, in broad terms, a fund is
usually deemed to be pursuing a passive investment strategy if it holds a well-
diversified portfolio, does not engage in extensive buy-and-sell activity, and
closely tracks an index.85 So-called ‘index trackers’ seek to replicate the per-
formance of a market index, such as the FTSE-350,86 by investing only in the
constituents of the relevant index on a weighted basis. Stock is only bought-
and-sold upon shifts within the index when the index itself reconstitutes.87
83 Tilba and Reisberg (2019), n 64 above, 485-486.
84 In 2017,92 and 88 per cent of asset owners outsourced engagement and voting,respectively (The
Investment Association, and Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association, Stewardship in Practice
2016 (London:The Investment Association, 2017) 5). A small proportion of asset managers also
outsource engagement and voting (six and 13 per cent, respectively) (ibid,5),hence the additional
focus on service providers in the 2020 Code.
85 K. James et al, ‘Does the growth of passive investing affect equity market performance?: A liter-
ature review’ (2019) FCA Research Note 1, 4.
86 An index ranks listed companies on various measures of performance. The FTSE-350 is an
index maintained by a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange comprising the 350 largest
premium-listed companies by market capitalisation.
87 The constituents of the FTSE-350, for example, are reviewed on a quarterly basis (FTSE Russell,
‘FTSE 350 Index: Factsheet’ 31 March 2020).
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With no discretionary buy-and-sell decisions being made, research costs, and
therefore fees, are low, and, accordingly, beneficiaries are provided with an eco-
nomical option with which to share in the performance of a specific index of
stock.88 Passive investments form an increasing proportion of UK-equity own-
ership.89
Although on the face of it passive funds have the most to gain by issuer-
specific engagement, since they do not have the option of exiting the rele-
vant investment for so long as the issuer is a constituent of the index that the
fund tracks,90 the reality is very different. The academic literature has regularly
noted the conundrum for asset managers that pursue a passive investment strat-
egy. Firstly, passive funds slavishly track an index, and their products are sold on
the proposition that returns will accurately correlate with the performance of
the index.91 An index-tracker will have little concern that a poorly performing
company within the index could reduce the overall value of the portfolio, since
it will not impact the capacity of the index-tracker to satisfy its remit to track
the index accurately. Second, since an index-tracker fund does not make calcu-
lated decisions as to whether to invest in individual equities, with the decisions
driven purely by index-inclusion, there is no prerequisite to allocate resources
to issuer-specific research expertise which would otherwise inform investment
decisions.92 Without such expertise, it becomes difficult for passive investors to
identify engagement opportunities. Third, passive funds will have highly diver-
sified portfolios of hundreds or even thousands of issuers, with relatively small
investments in individual companies; therefore, an engagement with an indi-
vidual issuer will, even if successful, have only a very small impact on portfolio
value.93 In many cases, the costs of the engagement will outweigh the benefits
to the portfolio, and, therefore, the relevant engagement, although potentially
in the best interests of the issuer, will not be in the best interests of the asset
manager’s client94 (with a caveat that for the largest asset managers, such institu-
tions will manage the assets of numerous asset owner portfolios, and,potentially,
the relevant costs could be shared between all those portfolios95). Finally, and
88 Fisch, n 75 above, 110;G. Strampelli, ‘Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Gov-
ernance Consequences of Passive Investing’ (2018) 55 San Diego L Rev 803, 809.
89 In 2018, passive funds accounted for approximately 26 per cent of all UK assets under manage-
ment (rising from only 16 per cent in 2008), and 42 per cent of UK-managed equity assets were
managed passively (The Investment Association, ‘Asset Management in the UK 2018-2019:The
Investment Association Annual Survey’ September 2019, 45).
90 J. Fisch, A. Hamdani and S. Davidoff Solomon, ‘The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical
Framework for Passive Investors’ (2019) 168 U Pa L Rev 17, 37; I.R. Appel, T.A. Gormley and
D.B. Keim, ‘Passive investors, not passive owners’ (2016) 121 J Financ Econ 111, 113.
91 Fisch, n 75 above, 110; V. Sushko and G.Turner, ‘The implications of passive investing for secu-
rities markets’ (2018) BIS Quarterly Review 113, 119.
92 ibid; Davies, n 20 above, 14.
93 R. Gilson and J. Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights’ (2013) 113 CLR 863, 891; L. Bebchuk, A. Cohen and S.
Hirst, ‘The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors’ (2017) 31 J Econ Perspect 89, 96.
94 L. Bebchuk and S. Hirst, ‘Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evi-
dence, and Policy’ (2019) 119 CLR 2029, 2051.
95 W. Ringe, ‘Stewardship and Shareholder Engagement in Germany’ ECGI Working Paper No
501/2020 (2020) 1, 11. On the other hand, large asset managers may be ill-suited to take ad-
vantage of such economies of scale in relation to issuer-specific engagement (as opposed to
14
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importantly, a successful intervention by a passive asset manager will equally
benefit all of its competitors that passively track the same index, but only the
asset manager who intervenes will bear the costs of the engagement.96 The
portfolio managed by the intervening asset manager will generate less returns
for asset owners than competitors after the costs of engagement have been de-
ducted from profits, or charged as fees. Those accrued engagement costs can
therefore also impact the perceived performance of the intervening passive as-
set manager (and underlying asset owner) if it is assessed on the margin of its
index-tracking errors relative to errors made by other passive asset managers.97
Even though a successful issuer-specific engagement could be deemed to be in
the best interests of beneficiaries overall by creating value, if an asset owner has
a choice of multiple asset managers tracking the same index, it would be in the
interests of its beneficiaries to select an asset manager not so engaging and free-
ride on the efforts of an engaging asset manager.98 This creates a predicament
for asset managers – if it is not in the interests of beneficiaries for asset owners to
select intervening asset managers, commercial incentives will dictate that those
asset managers do not engage on issuer-specific matters,99 even if they are over-
all wealth-maximising for clients.Although successful engagement can increase
the fees payable to the asset manager,100 if asset owners, acting in the interests of
their beneficiaries, reject that asset manager in favour of non-intervening asset
managers, the asset manager will soon cease to attract clients. The Stewardship
Code has essentially attempted to supersede the commercial incentive aspects
– the aspiration is that by requiring signatories to disclose their commitment to
engagement,a market for engagement will be created whereunder beneficiaries,
seeing the ‘greater good’,will select asset owners based upon their proclivity to
select asset managers with substantive engagement strategies, leading to all asset
holistic-risk engagement described later in this article), due to conflicts of interest between dif-
ferent,not necessarily equity-investment, funds being managed (J.Morley, ‘Too Big to be Activist’
(2019) 92 S Cal L Rev 1407).Financial- or business-ties between large asset managers and issuers
may also create conflicts to engagement (Bebchuk and Hirst, ibid, 2062).
96 Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 894; Bebchuk and Hirst, ibid, 2057; Davies, n 20 above, 16; M.
Isaksson and S. Çelik, ‘Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity Markets’ OECD
Corporate Governance Working Papers No 8 (2013) 1, 42; S. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy
and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119 HLR 1735, 1753; Bebchuk,Cohen and Hirst, n
93 above, 98.
97 C. Rawson and S. Rowe, ‘Disengaged Owners and Financial Reporting: Evidence form the
index funds’ 1, 8 (2019) at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459513. Some commentators have also
remarked that when asset managers are assessed on the basis of relative performance, taking
such asset managers across the industry as a whole, it can create agency costs for underlying
beneficiaries, since the interests of asset managers in maximising relative performance may not
be aligned with the interests of beneficiaries in maximising overall returns (Gilson and Gordon,
ibid, 889-890). However, when taking passive asset managers on an individual basis, as discussed
in this article (see text accompanying n 98 below), the interests of beneficiaries are best served
by an asset owner selecting an asset manager that does not undertake issuer-specific engagement,
and, instead, free-rides upon the efforts of others.
98 Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst, n 93 above, 98; Strampelli, n 88 above, 815.
99 Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 890. For practical evidence of the passivity of passive investors,
see B. Cheffins,The Public Company Transformed (Oxford: OUP, 2019) 378-379.
100 Most passive fund fees are based upon a percentage of assets under management (AUM). If the
engagement creates value that exceeds the costs of the engagement,AUM,and, correspondingly,
the asset manager’s fees, increase.
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managers commercially pursuing such engagement strategies. Such a market
has not materialised.101 This brings into stark light the flaws in a voluntary soft-
law code – where only some, and not all, index-tracker asset managers engage,
it will consistently be in the best interests of beneficiaries for asset owners to
select non-engaging asset managers.
Active investment
Although passive investment is becoming increasingly prevalent in the UK-
equity markets, the majority of asset management is conducted on an active
basis. A genuinely active asset manager will not track a particular index, and
will, instead, continually make buy-and-hold decisions, for its clients, across the
market based upon its determination of how best to improve portfolio value.102
For most active investors, similar considerations, to those which are relevant to
passive funds,will apply, since many will,with a view to reducing risk, pursue a
diversified investment policy,103 and, therefore,will elect for asset managers that
can collate a diversified portfolio of numerous equities across multiple indus-
tries104 (passive index-tracking is the ultimate low-cost manifestation of such
preferences).With only a relatively small proportion of a portfolio’s shares held
in individual issuers, again, the costs of engagement may outweigh the bene-
fits.105 Also, competitors invested in the same issuers will share in the success
of the intervention without suffering the costs,106 which will be concerning
for those active asset managers that are assessed by asset owners on the basis of
relative performance107 – the investment mandate is likely to require at least a
101 Chiu and Katelouzou, n 20 above, 150. If a market for ‘stewardship’ more generally exists, it
is currently very small (D. Katelouzou and E. Micheler, ‘The Market for Stewardship and the
Role of Government’ (2020) 1, 10-17 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3704258). Although, in the
US, commentators have suggested that voluntary stewardship disclosures evidence the existence
of a market for stewardship (A. Hamdani and S. Hannes, ‘The Future of Shareholder Activism’
(2019) 99 B U L Rev 971, 982),most of such disclosures do not relate to issuer-specific engage-
ments beyond governance issues (for example see n 179 below), or holistic-risk issues discussed
further below (text accompanying nn 179-180 below). Furthermore, investors may not have the
expertise to evaluate stewardship credentials (Bebchuk and Hirst, n 94 above, 2073).
102 It should be noted that certain active asset managers, sometimes referred to as ‘closet indexers’
(S.Hirst and K.Kastiel, ‘Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion’ (2019) 99 B U L Rev 1229,
1250), will mimic a passive strategy, since, for example, fund managers may invest a significant
portion of assets under management in the indices to hedge risk if the performance of such fund
managers is being assessed against the performance of indices (B. Cheffins, ‘The Undermining
of UK Corporate Governance (?)’ (2013) 33 OJLS 503, 513; Hirst and Kastiel, ibid, 1256), in
which case the same concerns as described above in relation to passive funds will still apply.
103 Arsalido, n 11 above, 363.
104 The classic study on portfolio selection by Markowitz outlined that for an investor trying to
garner returns, but reduce risk, diversification is the natural strategy (H. Markowitz, ‘Portfolio
Selection’ (1959) 7 J Financ 77, 89 and 91).
105 Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 891; Chiu, n 57 above, 461; Reisberg, n 11 above, 233. See
n 95 above, and accompanying text in relation to the potential for cost-sharing by large asset
managers.
106 Gilson and Gordon, ibid, 893;Arsalidou,n 11 above,364;Bebchuk,Cohen and Hirst, n 93 above,
99.
107 Asset managers may, alternatively, be assessed on overall portfolio performance, but this is more
usual when mandated to invest in a broad range of different assets. In such cases, the focus will be
16
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minimum outperformance of unmanaged (passive) portfolios,108 and, commer-
cially, active asset managers will also be evaluated against each other.
One scenario where it may be in the interests of clients and beneficiaries
(and, by extension, an asset manager in commercial terms) to exercise issuer-
specific engagement would be where the portfolio is substantially ‘overweight’
in an issuer.109 In simple terms, an investor will be overweight in an issuer if
the proportion of the portfolio invested in the issuer is greater than the propor-
tion that it owns of the market generally.110 If the asset manager has invested
a substantially greater proportion of the portfolio in the issuer as compared to
competitor active asset managers, and the issuer performs poorly, the portfolio
will be disproportionately impaired, and, as a corollary, successful engagement
will garner greater returns for the engaging asset manager than competitors.111
However,having become overweight in an issuer’s stock, issuer-specific engage-
ment will be predisposed upon the asset manager initially expending resources
on detailed analysis of the relevant company to ascertain whether there is an
issue on which it could engage to increase share value, and, subsequently,having
identified the issue, on actually engaging with management and lobbying for
change.The benefits of taking both the initial and subsequent actions are highly
uncertain, since they will only create value if three conditions are fulfilled - the
initial analysis identifies an issue, the subsequent engagement is successful in
instigating change, and the change results in greater long-term value for the
issuer. The level of uncertainty could deter the asset manager from expending
resources in identifying issues in the first place, and, even if the asset manager
were to identify an issue, the high uncertainty of the other two conditions will
likely make a decision to sell the stock (or at least to sell sufficient stock so that
the investor is no longer overweight) more rational than engaging.112 In par-
ticular, if the third condition is not satisfied, it is possible that the engagement
could even result in a negative impact on the issuer’s performance, in which case
the asset manager suffers even greater damage as compared to its competitors
due to being overweight in the relevant stock.113 Overall,with great uncertainty
of success, except in the most obvious cases of mismanagement at issuers, it will
rarely be in the best interests of clients and beneficiaries for an asset manager
to regularly expend costs in speculative research and engagement.
on allocation effectiveness, and the noise of individual stock performance will be drowned out
by overall equities performance compared to other assets in the portfolio (Gilson and Gordon,
ibid, 894).
108 A.R. Admati, P. Pfleiderer and J. Zechner, ‘Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Fi-
nancial Market Equilibrium’ (1994) 102 J Political Econ 1097, 1100. Such ‘benchmarking’ can,
as with passive asset managers (n 97 above), lead to the interests of asset managers deviating from
the interests of beneficiaries (Gilson and Gordon, ibid, 889-890 and 893).
109 P. Frentrop, ‘The Engaged Investor:The paradoxes of stewardship’ IPE Magazine February 2011;
B. Black and J. Coffee, ‘Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited Regula-
tion’ (1994) 92 Mich L Rev 1997, 2070.
110 Black and Coffee, ibid, 2048.
111 Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst, n 93 above, 99.
112 Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 893. Exit was the determination of many institutional investors
in banks prior to the 2008 financial crisis (A. Dignam, ‘The Future of Shareholder Democracy
in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis’ (2013) 36 Seattle U L Rev 639, 651-652).
113 Notably, the empirical evidence on whether shareholder engagement is conducive to firm value
is inconclusive (n 120 below).
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If the discussion above paints a pessimistic picture in terms of issuer-specific
engagement, it should not be taken to mean that passive and active institutional
investors do not engage at all. Indeed, in terms of voting, institutional investors
have progressively become more participatory over the years.114 If a resolution
is put up for a vote by issuer management, institutional investors will generally
vote their shares. Institutional investors may also engage with issuer boards in
relation to those matters prior to the vote; particularly on executive remuner-
ation115 or governance matters.116 However, concerns exist that institutional
investors are merely box-ticking against industry norms,117 or relying on proxy
advisors who, in turn, have been accused of box-ticking themselves, rather than
truly considering whether the relevant governance or pay arrangements are
appropriate for the issuer in question.118 As above, significant expenditure on
relevant analysis by passive or active funds is unlikely.Intervention on the basis of
inadequate expertise, research and analysis could negatively impact issuer share
value,119 which perhaps explains why the evidence on whether shareholder en-
gagement of this nature improves issuer share value is inconclusive.120 The low-
costs involved make engagement on tick-box governance issues the engagement
of choice for ‘defensive’ institutional investors,121 rather than proactive inter-
vention on performance and strategic matters,122 and, therefore, continuing to
114 See Black and Coffee, n 109 above, 2038. In 2019, the FTSE-100 and FTSE-250 average voting
levels were 75 and 77 per cent, respectively (KPMG and Makinson Cowell, ‘Review of the
2019 AGM season’ January 2020). Also see S. Gomtsian, ‘Shareholder Engagement by Large
Institutional Investors’ (2019) 1, 31 JCL forthcoming at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3412886;
Fisch,Hamdani and Davidoff Solomon, n 90 above, 43-47;Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 887.
115 F. Ferri and D. Maber, ‘Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK’
(2013) 17 Rev Financ 527, 546;R.Thomas and C.Van der Elst, ‘Say on Pay Around the World’
(2015) 92 Wash U L Rev 653,730;CIPD Research report, ‘Executive pay:Review of FTSE 100
executive pay packages’ August 2017, 2; KPMG Board Leadership Centre, ‘Guide to Directors’
Remuneration 2017’ (December 2017) at 11.
116 Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016), n 90 above, 124-126; Davies, n 20 above, 13-14.
117 The UK CGC outlines ‘best practice’ for premium-listed companies.Various bodies also publish
executive pay expectations and recommendations (for example Investment Association, ‘Princi-
ples of Remuneration’ (2019)).
118 Reddy, n 35 above, 698-703.
119 Fisch, n 75 above, 114; N. Boyson and R. Mooradian, ‘Corporate governance and hedge fund
activism’ (2011) 14 Rev Deriv Res 169, 171; D. Lund, ‘The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting’ (2018) 43 J Corp L 493, 513; D. Lund, ‘Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate
Governance’ (2019) 71 Stan L Rev 687, 726. In the paper, Z. Goshen and R. Squire, ‘Principal
Costs:A Theory for Corporate Law and Governance’ (2017) 117 Colum LRev 767, it was noted
that ‘principal costs’ could be incurred by giving shareholders extensive powers to intervene
when they are uninformed or inexperienced to do so.
120 For a discussion on the empirical evidence, see R.Romano, ‘Less is More:Making Institutional
Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance’ (2001) 18 Yale J Regul 174,
187-191; S. Gillan and L. Starks, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States’
(2007) 19 J App Corp Fin 55, 61-62; J.Karpoff, ‘The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target
Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings’ (2001) 1, 19 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=885365.
In contrast, there is some limited UK evidence of a positive correlation between engagement
and issuer operating performance (M. Becht et al, ‘Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence
from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund’ (2009) 22 Rev Financ Stud 3094, 3118).
121 For the difference between defensive and offensive institutional investors, see nn 132-133 below,
and accompanying text.
122 n 128 below,and accompanying text;n 179.Also see Bebchuk and Hirst,n 94 above,2090;Gilson
and Gordon, n 93 above 889; Gomtsian, n 114 above; L. Bebchuk, ‘The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power’ (2005) 118 HLR 833, 876; Strampelli, n 88 above, 823-825.
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encourage issuer-specific engagement will likely only heighten box-ticking en-
gagement on governance matters that could, in fact, have no effect, or even a
detrimental effect,on issuers.Even though the Stewardship Code originally en-
visaged that the UK CGC and the Stewardship Code would operate hand-in-
glove, such that the Stewardship Code would encourage institutional investors
to engage on matters based upon governance disclosures made by issuers under
the UK CGC,123 merely intervening on governance matters does not accord
with the urgings of Walker, Kay or Kingman, and the engagement that Walker
and Kay, in particular, had in mind was a utopia where investors continually
monitored issuer strategy to proactively determine problems and intervene be-
fore they became serious.124 Notably, The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS),
which significantly suffered during the financial crisis, was in compliance with
all but one of the provisions of the UK CGC.125
The Kay Review was conscious that the costs of adequately detailed research
and engagement could deter successful and value-enhancing intervention, and
suggested that a forum of like-minded asset managers be constituted so that
costs could be shared, and influence enhanced through scale,126 leading to the
creation of ‘The Investor Forum’. In its first five years of existence, though,
the Investor Forum has only conducted 32 issuer engagements,127 and, in 2019,
it only conducted engagements with six companies, most of which related to
governance and board succession issues.128 The few strategic interventions were
generally broad in nature rather than pertaining to specific issues that required
resolution.129 Even when costs of engagement are shared, it is unlikely that
individual asset managers will raise engagement propositions within the Investor
Forum for fear of tipping-off competitors who may exit the investment,causing
a decline in share price,130 meaning that issuer-specific strategic engagement by
the Investor Forum would have to operate on the basis of collaborative research
across multiple companies, which is deterred due to the high costs involved to
adequately reduce the uncertainties surrounding the success of engagements.
The resulting broad nature of engagements, when they do occur, is a rational
consequence of such dynamics.
Beyond reactionary voting on governance matters, scope for successful
proactive issuer-specific engagement will only transpire if the uncertainties
surrounding engagement can be minimised. Furthermore, encouraging issuer-
specific engagement on strategic aspects, when resources are not expended by
institutional investors to adequately inform themselves prior to engagement,
could even result in detrimental effects on issuer share value. The uncertainties
that deter successful engagement could be moderated, though, if the relevant
123 Stewardship Code 2010, n 7 above, 1; H. Birkmose and M. Madsen, ‘The Danish Stewardship
Code – The past, the present and the future’ (2020) 1 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533834.
124 Walker Review, n 5 above, 78;Kay Review, n 27 above, 45; Stewardship Code 2012, n 28 above,
1; BIS Committee, n 11 above, 36; Davies, n 20 above, 13-14.
125 RBS Annual Report and Accounts 2007, 99.
126 Kay Review, n 27 above, 50.
127 The Investor Forum, ‘Annual Review 2019’ (London: The Investor Forum CIC, 2019) 8.
128 ibid, 17-22.
129 As an exception, see n 140 below.
130 The ‘Race to the Exit’ scenario - Black and Coffee, n 109 above, 2061-2062.
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investor eschews a diversified portfolio strategy in favour of larger investments
in a small number of issuers, and conducts significant analysis to identify po-
tential share-value maximising engagements prior to investing in the relevant
issuer. In fact, it has been modelled that, from a risk-exposure perspective, it is
unlikely that an investor will become so overweight in an issuer to the extent
that the benefits of engagement outweigh the costs, unless an investor has com-
mitted to engagement prior to investment.131 Such ‘offensive activism’may be
the primary avenue of substantive issuer-specific engagement.
Offensive activism
‘Defensive’ and ‘offensive’ activism can be distinguished. Defensive activism
occurs where an investor already has an interest in an issuer and identifies
weaknesses or risks within the company. The investor then engages on an
issuer-specific basis to rectify those issues to increase the long-term value of the
investment.132 As noted above, defensive activism is not likely to be prevalent
beyond mere governance-related matters. Offensive activism, on the other
hand, involves an investor, or potential investor, identifying an issuer where a
change of strategy could result in greater shareholder returns, and subsequently
acquiring shares prior to engagement in order to maximise the investor’s share
of the potential gains post-engagement.133
Offensive activism is a beloved strategy of hedge funds,134 but they rarely
acquire sufficient shares in any issuer to be able to instigate change by exer-
cise of their voting power,135 and, therefore, to persuade an issuer’s board to
change its strategic course, the hedge fund will require the support of other
institutional investors, or at least the perceived support of those investors.136
In the US, institutional investors will readily support hedge fund offensive ac-
tivist campaigns.137 Although, the tendency of institutional investors in the UK
131 Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner, n 108 above, 1101.
132 Chiu and Katelouzou, n 20 above, 137;B.Cheffins and J.Armour, ‘The Past, Present, and Future
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’ (2011) 37 J Corp L 51, 56.
133 Cheffins and Armour, ibid,56;Bebchuk,Cohen and Hirst,n 93 above,105;E.Rock, ‘Institutional
Investors in Corporate Governance’ in J. Gordon and W. Ringe (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Corporate Law and Governance (Oxford: OUP, 2018) 382.
134 Cheffins and Armour, ibid, 56.
135 For companies incorporated in England and Wales, at least a majority of votes exercised at a
shareholders’ meeting is required to pass shareholders’ ordinary resolutions (CA 2006, ss 281-
282), and, generally, shareholders must hold at least five per cent of the votes in the company to
call a general meeting of shareholders (CA 2006, s 303), or require a resolution to be placed on
the agenda of the annual general meeting of a public company (CA 2006, s 338). Additionally,
100 members with voting rights, holding on average £100 of the paid-up capital per member,
can also propose resolutions at the annual general meeting (CA 2006, s 338).
136 W. Bratton and M. Wachter, ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 158 Uni
Penn L Rev 653, 684; Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 897; Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst, n 93
above, 106. Also see LexisNexis, ‘Market Tracker Trend Report” Recent trends in UK Share-
holder activism’ (2020) 1,34 and 37.The term ‘rationally reticent’has been used to describe how
US institutional investors will not proactively engage with issuers, but will engage in response
to proposals and engagement campaigns commenced by others (Gilson and Gordon, ibid, 867).
137 I.R. Appel, T.A. Gormley and D.B. Keim, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of
Passive Investors on Activism’ (2019) 32 Rev Fin Stud 2720, 2760;Hamdani and Hannes, n 101
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to support hedge fund campaigns has traditionally been much lower,138 offen-
sive activism has been rising in the UK in the years following the resurrection
of the credit markets after the 2008 financial crisis.139 Offensive activism can
awaken conventionally defensive institutional investors, including passive funds,
to act, and engage with issuer boards with a view to instigating the changes
being requested by the hedge fund.140 The commercial, competitive and finan-
cial deterrents to passive and active asset manager issuer-specific engagement
outlined above are mitigated, since the research and analysis heavy-lifting has
been completed by the hedge fund,which must present sufficient due diligence
to induce institutional investors to support the campaign.141 Even though any
gains from the campaign will accrue to all institutional investors invested in the
issuer, since the costs are low (and likely to also be incurred by competitor asset
managers), engagement by those institutional investors can (if the relevant pro-
posal is successful and value-enhancing) be in the best interests of clients and
beneficiaries, creating increases in the absolute value of the relevant portfolio
without expending disproportionate costs compared to other asset managers.142
Additionally, in the US, it appears that the very threat of offensive activism has
created a dynamic whereby issuer boards will pre-empt potential hedge fund
intervention, and, therefore, proactively engage with existing institutional in-
vestors to improve performance.143 Indirectly, offensive activism could be en-
couraging institutional investor engagement even where a hedge fund has not
commenced a campaign.
The Stewardship Code’s influence on offensive activism is, though, negligi-
ble.Hedge funds pursue an offensive activist approach as part of a clearly defined
commercial strategy, and will do so whether or not the Stewardship Code en-
courages engagement.144 Therefore, if at least one type of investor is engaging
in proactive, rather than reactionary, activism as apparently extolled by Walker,
Kingman et al, and those investors are also drawing other institutional investors
into engagement, one may argue that shareholder engagement is vibrant and
above, 978-979; B. Cheffins, ‘The Team Production Model as a Paradigm’ (2015) 38 Seattle U
L Rev 397, 730; Strampelli, n 88 above, 829; Cheffins and Armour, n 132 above, 87.
138 A recent example of institutional investors declining en masse to support an activist proposal was
when Sherborne Investors failed to gain a board seat at Barclays plc in 2019 (LexisNexis, n 136
above, 31).
139 Activist Insight and Skadden, ‘Activist Investing in Europe 2019’ (2019) at 7; LexisNexis, ibid, 11
(although, note that a drop in the prevalence of activist campaigns in the first half of 2020 can
be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020).
140 As an example, in 2019, the Investor Forum intervened at First Group plc in response to activist
proposals (Investor Forum, n 127 above, 17).
141 Gilson and Gordon, n 93 above, 896;Davies, n 20 above, 13. By analogy, it has been argued that
US institutional investors will enforce against corporate wrongs and fraud at issuers where the
heavy-lifting has been undertaken by journalists, regulators, whistleblowers and entrepreneurial
lawyers (A.Platt, ‘Index Fund Enforcement’ (2019) 1,29 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3430643).
142 Anecdotal evidence suggests that defensive institutional investors may even solicit offensive ac-
tivist investors to research and investigate issuer-specific matters (Hamdani and Hannes, n 101
above, 989; Lund (2018), n 119 above, 505).
143 Hamdani and Hannes, ibid, 984. In relation to issuers implementing commonly requested activist
measures prior to the commencement of activist campaigns, see N. Gantchev, O. Gredil and C.
Jotikasthira, ‘Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism’ (2019) 23
RF 1031.
144 Davies, n 20 above, 20.
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the need for the Stewardship Code is overstated.However, it is unlikely that this
style of activism is the type of engagement that is desired by the FRC.Walker,
in fact, decried the impact of offensive activism, railing against the short-term
connotations, such as increased dividends, share buy-backs, and putting issuers
up for sale.145 Although several studies have challenged the propensity for hedge
fund activism to only create short-term profits at the expense of the long-term
health of issuers,146 many commentators have derided hedge fund activism as
targeting companies from which short-term value can be extracted, without
any consideration for how the company will perform in the long-term.147 Fur-
thermore,hedge fund activists have been accused of being offensive in nature as
well as strategy, employing aggressive techniques to achieve their ends.148 Such
behaviour conflicts with the concept of constructive engagement encouraged
by the Stewardship Code.149
Given that offensive activists appear to be the only institutional investors who
are motivated and incentivised to engage on issuer-specific matters, and the
only institutional investors for whom it will regularly be in the interests of their
beneficiaries to engage, it could be argued that the Stewardship Code should
embrace such institutional investors and cajole them into behaving as originally
envisaged by the Code.150 Persuasion of such a nature would require the de-
lineation of comply-or-explain best practice recommendations to advocate for
more constructive, rather than antagonistic, engagement, with a view to long-
term, rather than short-term, issuer profitability. However, the FRC rejected
the ‘best practice’ approach in the 2020 Code,151 and, in any case, even with
such an approach, it is difficult to see how the conduct of hedge funds, if they
could be compelled to sign-up to the Stewardship Code,would be meaningfully
transformed by soft-law disclosure – investors in hedge funds are usually large
institutional asset owners (such as pension funds) and high net-worth individu-
als, which are sufficiently sophisticated to apprehend the strategy and approach
taken by most hedge funds.152 Even with the reputation of hedge funds to pri-
145 Walker Review, n 5 above, 78.
146 Boyson and Mooradian, n 119 above, 193; D. Katelouzou, ‘Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund
Activism: Some Empirical Evidence’ (2013) 7 Va L & Bus Rev 459; L. Bebchuk,A.Brav and W.
Jiang, ‘The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism’ (2015) 115 CLR 1085, 1127.
147 J. Coffee and D. Palia, ‘The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism
on Corporate Governance’ (2016) 1 Annal Corp Gov 1, 59-62; Kay Review, n 27
above, 37; Strine, n 81 above; S. Denning, ‘The Seven Deadly Sins Of Activist Hedge
Funds’ Forbes 15 February 2015 at https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/
the-seven-deadly-sins-of -activist-hedge-funds/.
148 J. Wieczner, ‘Inside Elliott Management: How Paul Singer’s Hedge Fund Always
Wins’ Fortune 7 December 2017 at https://fortune.com/2017/12/07/elliott-managem
ent-hedge-fund-paul-singer/.
149 The Stewardship Code has long advocated ‘purposeful dialogue’ (Stewardship Code 2010, n 7
above, 1; Stewardship Code 2012, n 28 above, 1 and principle 1).
150 Some commentators have suggested that engagement by institutional investors as a whole can be
enhanced by creating a more conducive environment for offensive activism (Gilson and Gordon,
n 93 above, 902-916).
151 nn 33-37 above, and accompanying text.
152 K. Amadeo, ‘Hedge Fund Investors: Who They Are and Why They Do It’ The Balance 25
June 2019 at https://www.thebalance.com/who-invests-in-hedge-funds-and-why-3306239. It
is likely that, for most hedge funds,marketing to unsophisticated UK retail investors will not be
permitted (FSMA 2000, s 238; COBS 4.12).
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oritise short-term profits, they presumably believe investment in hedge funds to
be in their, and their beneficiaries’, best interests. Like a bad Bond villain,153 if
hedge funds were required to disclose against best practice provisions espousing
long-termism and constructive engagement, they would simply openly disclose
their potentially contradictory approaches before putting them into operation.
In such circumstances, it is difficult to see how behaviour would be modified –
investors know how hedge funds act, whether they are required to disclose or
not.
Putting issuer-specific engagement into context
Well-informed issuer-specific engagement on strategic matters, prompted by
defensive activists, will rarely be the preferred option for asset managers,
whether active or passive, and no manner of voluntary soft-law encourage-
ment will influence them to do otherwise. As such, the 2020 Code will not
enhance the traditional form of issuer-specific engagement as espoused by the
Walker Review, and, if the Kingman Review has put the Code on final notice,
it is on borrowed time. On the contrary, the danger exists that further pres-
sure, pursuant to the 2020 Code, on institutional investors to exercise issuer-
specific engagement will simply increase governance, uninformed or superfi-
cial engagements,which do not necessarily improve the performance of issuers.
However, if the regulators were to be given one further chance, all may not be
lost when it comes to issuer-specific engagement. Institutional investor involve-
ment in issuer-specific strategic matters is promoted by the actions of offensive
activists,154 and, therefore, the focus should turn to how and when other insti-
tutional investors support offensive activist campaigns.155 In those specific cases,
disclosure by asset managers of engagement strategy when presented with of-
fensive activist proposals, and by asset owners of the engagement strategy sought
when selecting asset managers, and how those strategies conform to the invest-
ment horizons of beneficiaries, could be useful information for both clients
and beneficiaries. Some have speculated that the increasing prevalence of pas-
sive investors,with longer-term considerations than traditional hedge firms,will
influence hedge firm activist campaigns to focus on longer-term issues, rather
than short-term value orientated proposals, to garner support from those pas-
sive investors.156 In such cases, disclosure by defensive activists as to when they
will support offensive activism would be conducive to a longer-term focus
by hedge funds. Of course, the foregoing supposition assumes that defensive
activists will only support offensive activist campaigns that create long-term
153 I. Fleming,Casino Royale (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953).
154 M.Kahan and E.Rock, ‘Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’ (2007)
155 U Penn L Rev 1021, 1045; Strampelli, n 88 above, 826. Also see n 141 above, and accom-
panying text.
155 Even passive investors can be pivotal voters when offensive activists make issuer-specific proposals
(Fisch, Hamdani and Davidoff Solomon, n 90 above, 42).
156 Appel, Gormley and Keim (2019), n 137 above, 2760; Strampelli, n 88 above, 830; Lund (2018),
n 119 above, 505; S. Alvaro, M. Maugeri and G. Strampelli, ‘Institutional investors, corporate
governance and stewardship codes’ (2019) 1, 44 at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393780.
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value, and the need for more robust disclosure is emphasised by suggestions
by other commentators that such investors may not always tailor their support
for offensive activist campaigns in line with the optimal interests of issuers.157
Although the 2020 Code, like previous versions of the Code, does urge partic-
ipation in collaborative engagement, and now also urges disclosure of activities
and outcomes in relation thereto,158 the relevant Principle was never intended
to pertain to the possible support of hedge fund activism. Instead, it relates to
collaborative engagement between defensive institutional investors in a manner
that enables them to engage on issuer-specific matters at scale. In fact, the en-
gagement that does occur is primarily by offensive activists,with the traditional
defensive activists,which make up the signatories to the Code,either supporting
or rejecting the offensive activist proposal. It is therefore sometimes not even
‘engagement’ per se by the defensive activists. Accordingly, if the FRC wishes
to persist with a Code with issuer-specific engagement as a principal theme,
it should acknowledge offensive activist engagement as the primary instiga-
tor of stewardship action by signatories, rather than attempting to encourage
a style of traditional issuer-specific engagement by defensive institutional in-
vestors that is doomed to failure. The Code should specifically reference the
need for asset owners and asset managers to set-out exactly how and in what
circumstances they will support, and engage with issuers in response to, activist
campaigns,159 to give beneficiaries (and activists) valuable information which
can, subsequently, be assessed against actual decision-making. Although these
disclosure requirements would be buttressed by disclosing examples of activities
and outcomes, ironically, given Kingman’s exhortation to focus less on policy
and more on outcomes, disclosure of the policy in this regard may be a more
useful disclosure for beneficiaries.160
THE BROADER SCOPE OF THE 2020 CODE AND HOLISTIC-RISK
ENGAGEMENT
The possibility that strategic issuer-specific engagement by defensive institu-
tional investors is a lost cause may have persuaded the FRC to take the concept
of stewardship engagement outside of its comfort zone. The 2020 Code envis-
ages that it should be incumbent on institutional investors to disclose how they
157 Lund (2018), ibid, 521 – passive funds may be deterred from supporting activist campaigns due to
conflicts of interest (in particular, if the relevant engagement in the issuer could have a detrimental
effect on the performance of other issuers that compete with the relevant issuer and form part
of the fund’s portfolio), and the need to expend at least some costs in assessing the proposal.
158 2020 Code, n 2 above, Principle 10.
159 For example the asset managers,State Street,BlackRock and Legal & General already voluntarily
make disclosures of this nature (State Street, Stewardship Report 2018-19 92; BlackRock, 2019
Investment Stewardship Annual Report 23; Legal & General, 2019 Active Ownership Report 26).
Greater recognition of the offensive activist dynamic by the Stewardship Code could harmonise
the detail, substance and value of such disclosures.
160 Unlike previous versions of the Code, Principle 10 of the 2020 Code, which relates to collab-
orative engagement, no longer requires the disclosure of policies on collaborative engagement,
and, instead, the reporting expectations only require disclosure of activities and outcomes.
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promote well-functioning markets by identifying and responding to systemic
and market-wide risks,161 and integrate stewardship (including material ESG
and climate change issues) into their investment approaches.162 The new slant
to the 2020 Code could, in some respects, save the Code as an aid to engage-
ment, albeit in a different format to what was originally envisaged. The 2020
Code defines market-wide risks as risks that lead to financial loss across the
entire market, and systemic risks as risks that lead to the collapse of an indus-
try, financial market or economy;163 in the remainder of this article, they shall
be described singularly as ‘holistic-risks’, being matters that affect a substantial
number of companies or whole industries. Holistic-risks could, for example,
include changes in interest rates, economic downturns, credit crunches, pan-
demics, and climate change.
Unlike issuer-specific risks, holistic-risks, which affect multiple portfolio
companies, can not be hedged through diversification of the equity portfolio.164
Therefore, for an active investor, it may well be in the interests of beneficiaries
and clients to conduct engagement, of sorts, with issuers on holistic-risks.
Although costs are incurred in developing policies on which, and how,holistic-
risks should be mitigated by issuers, in the event of those risks emerging, the
potential gains, accrued across the portfolio, can be considerable. Furthermore,
if the relevant risk crystallises, for an active investor, a competitive advantage
can, in some cases, be garnered compared to other asset managers that have not
so engaged, since,presumably, those issuers that do not disclose the implementa-
tion of the necessary risk-mitigation measures after engagement will be omitted
from the relevant portfolio of the engaging investor. Such a hold-or-exit strat-
egy chimes with the 2020 Code’s new imploration that signatories incorporate
material ESG and climate change issues (amongst other stewardship aspects)
into their investment approaches,165 including acquisition and hold decisions.166
Costs are also low; rather than forensic analysis of individual companies, en-
gagement can be conducted by the investor simply by publicly stating the level
of disclosure expected from issuers, and the measures that the investor expects
issuers to put in place to mitigate against specific holistic-risks. The low-cost
nature of holistic-risk engagement is evidenced by BlackRock’s (the leading
asset manager, by assets under management, of UK assets in equities167) recent
declarations on climate-change.168 In identifying climate change as an invest-
ment risk, BlackRock has notified investee companies that it expects them to
161 2020 Code, n 2 above, Principle 4.
162 ibid, Principle 7.
163 ibid, Principle 4 – Reporting Expectations: ‘Outcome’.
164 Gilson and Gordon,n 93 above,869, fn 17; Jeffrey Gordon also made a similar remark specifically
regarding the 2020 COVID-19 global pandemic at the European Corporate Governance In-
stitute webinar ‘The COVID-19 Crisis and its Aftermath: Corporate Governance Implications
and Policy Challenges’ (16 April 2020).
165 2020 Code, n 2 above, Principle 7.
166 ibid, Reporting Expectations: Outcome.
167 See Figure 2. Blackrock is also the leading asset manager of US equities (J. Fichtner, ‘Hidden
power of the Big Three? Passive index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new
financial risk’ (2017) 19 Business and Politics 298, 304).
168 L. Fink (Chair and Chief Executive Officer of BlackRock), ‘2020 letter to CEOs’ 14 January
2020 at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.
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make disclosures in line with the requirements of the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (SASB)169 and the Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TFCD).170 Such disclosures by issuers should give institutional
investors sufficient information to ascertain issuer-exposure to the relevant
holistic-risk, and even without subsequently expending costs in examining
whether an issuer has in fact implemented the measures that it has disclosed it
has implemented, the investor can secure at least a degree of comfort.171
In contrast, for passive investors, as with issuer-specific engagement, the
incurrence of any costs in holistic-risk engagement that are disproportionate to
the costs being expended by competitors will place the passive fund in a worse
position than competitor investors. Even though, compared to issuer-specific
engagement, the potential gains are much higher for holistic-risk engagements
that affect multiple companies, passive investors cannot derive a competitive
benefit, since the benefits of successful engagement will accrue to all competi-
tor passive investors, and, unlike active investors, the engaging passive investor
cannot react to unsuccessful engagement by exiting the relevant investments.
Therefore, it is unlikely that passive investors will exercise any substantive
holistic-risk engagement, and will, instead, free-ride on the successful holistic-
risk engagement efforts of active investors. That does not mean that passive
investors are completely disconnected from the process, though, since passive
investors can still play a part in active investor holistic-risk engagements by vot-
ing, or threatening to vote, their shares in favour of active investor engagement
proposals. Additionally, the juxtaposition between active and passive investors
when it comes to holistic-risk engagement is not cut-and-dried.172 The largest
asset managers run both active and passive strategies for various clients. As
such, holistic-risk engagement can be undertaken on an institutional basis in
a manner that benefits both active and passive funds,173 with costs especially
low, since the institutional investor will be supporting market-wide initiatives
169 SASB is an independent standards board that has formulated a set of reporting standards on
sustainability topics.
170 TFCD, established by the Financial Stability Board, develops voluntary climate-related financial
risk disclosures. Recently, the FCA published forthcoming rules pursuant to which premium-
listed companies will be mandated, under the Listing Rules, to disclose their adherence to
the TFCD reporting requirements on a comply-or-explain basis (FCA, ‘Proposals to enhance
climate-related disclosures by listed issuers and clarification of existing disclosure obligations’
Policy Statement PS20/17, December 2020).
171 Directors of companies incorporated in England and Wales are liable for any misleading state-
ments in directors’ reports (CA 2006, s 463). Additionally, the making of false or misleading
statements with, for example, the intention to (or recklessly as to whether it may) induce an-
other person to exercise,or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by a relevant investment,
is a criminal offence under FSMA 2000, s 89.
172 Fisch, Hamdani and Davidoff Solomon, n 90 above, 43.
173 Large asset managers may not distinguish holistic-risk expectations between active and passive
funds (B. Novick et al (BlackRock), ‘Investment Stewardship Ecosystem’ Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate Governance 24 July 2018), and divergence in voting preferences between
individual funds managed by the same asset manager is rare (Griffith, n 72 above, 19). Some of
the conflicts that deter issuer-specific engagement on an institutional basis (n 95 above) are less
likely to be apparent with holistic-risk engagement, since holistic-risks are more likely to affect
multiple asset-types.
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across a number of issuers.174 Engagement of this nature can be particularly
effective given the concentration of asset management in the UK. In 2017, the
twenty largest global asset managers controlled 21.97 per cent of FTSE-350
companies.175 Such concentration means that when the largest asset managers
express their views on holistic-risks, issuers will tend to listen,176 and, in line
with the aspirations of the 2020 Code,177 institutional investors can, indeed,
contribute to well-functioning financial markets.
Holistic-risk engagement is not just a theoretical likelihood for institutional
investors – it also manifests itself in real-world examples. Figure 1 outlines ex-
amples of disclosed holistic-risk engagements conducted by BlackRock, Van-
guard and State Street, the three largest (by assets under management) asset
managers of equities in the US,178 and also by Legal & General and Baillie Gif-
ford,who, together with BlackRock, are the three largest asset managers of UK
institutional assets invested in equities – as shown in Figure 2, those three asset
managers dominate the top 20 managers of UK-assets in global equities.When
institutional investors engage on matters beyond mere governance, executive
pay and takeover matters, the issues are more commonly holistic-risk based
rather than issuer-specific.179 However, the disclosures of holistic-risk engage-
ment in Figure 1 derive from reports that have not been published in response
to any specific regulatory requirement or code, and, in particular, are separate
from other reports that have been produced by those institutional investors in
support of their disclosure obligations under the Stewardship Code.Active asset
managers are incentivised to conduct holistic-risk engagements since they are
clearly in the interests of clients and beneficiaries180 (and, therefore, in the com-
mercial interests of the institutional investors from the perspective of attracting
business) whether or not the Stewardship Code encourages such behaviour.
Therefore, in terms of encouraging holistic-risk engagement, the 2020 Code
may,in its current form,have little impact,but the purpose of the Code’s broader
174 Fisch, Hamdani and Davidoff Solomon, n 90 above, 39. However, the capacity for passive funds
to benefit from free-riding on active fund engagement within the same institution is limited by
the fact that active funds invest in fewer issuers than passive funds (Strampelli, n 88 above, 825).
175 Gomtsian, n 114 above, 9. As regards concentration, also see Figure 2.
176 Fisch, Hamdani and Davidoff Solomon, n 90 above, 40; Sushko and Turner, n 91 above, 121,
fn 13. Additionally, it is more effective for small numbers of large shareholders to engage with
issuers, rather than large numbers of asset managers with, potentially, divergent views (L. Strine,
‘Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological
Mythologists of Corporate Law’ (2014) 114 CLR 449, 475).
177 n 161 above, and accompanying text.
178 Fichtner, n 167 above, 304.
179 Vanguard has disclosed some issuer-specific engagements, but they were reactionary rather than
proactive strategy-related engagements (Vanguard, Investment Stewardship 2019 Annual Report
21). Indeed, Vanguard specifically states: ‘We don’t seek to dictate strategy. Rather, we want
to know that critical issues are being addressed.’ (ibid, 12). Baillie Gifford has also disclosed a
handful of issuer-specific engagements, but detailed examination suggests that these were mainly
governance- and executive remuneration-related (Baillie Gifford,Global Stewardship:Governance
and Sustainability Report 2019 26-33).
180 The Law Commission notes that taking into account ‘macroeconomic factors’ that affect the
portfolio as a whole is not a breach of trustees’ fiduciary duties, as long as the costs do not
outweigh the benefits (Law Commission (2013), n 55 above, 153). However, also see n 181
below.
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Figure 1: Examples of holistic-risk engagements by the largest asset managers of equities in the UK
and US.
scope may, more rationally, be related to securing better quality disclosure on
holistic-risk engagement.
The question remains, though, as to whether the 2020 Code will elicit ad-
equate disclosures of holistic-risk engagement. Clients and beneficiaries will
have an interest in knowing which holistic-risks are prioritised by institutional
investors so that, at least in relation to active investments, they can make invest-
ment decisions based upon their views as to whether the relevant institutional
investor is protecting against the appropriate holistic-risks or being too cautious
with respect to a holistic-risk that is doubtful to ever emerge.181 Currently,Prin-
ciple 4, which expressly references market-wide and systemic risks,182 requires
signatories to disclose their activities in relation to those risks (meaning exam-
ples of where they have taken those risks into account), and the outcomes of
181 The Law Commission notes that trustees should not consider ‘macroeconomic factors’ to the
extent that the financial benefits are too remote (Law Commission (2013), n 55 above, 153).
182 n 161, and accompanying text.
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Figure 2: Equities under Management (UK Top 20 Asset Managers) (data source: Investments &
Pensions in Europe Magazine (September 2019) 46).
those activities (meaning the effectiveness in responding to those risks). There
is no express requirement to inform clients and beneficiaries of their policies in
relation to holistic-risks,or which holistic-risks are prioritised and how they are
taken into account; the approach of Principle 4 reflects the underlying premise
of the Principle which is to ‘promote a well-functioning financial system’,rather
than to encourage holistic-risk engagement specifically. One could read into
Principle 7 (the requirement to integrate stewardship and investment183) that
there is an expectation on signatories to disclose the issues that they have pri-
oritised in assessing investments,184 which could potentially generate relevant
disclosures on holistic-risk engagement policy,but,again, the reporting expecta-
tions are far broader than (and will likely result in equally broad disclosures), and
do not specifically reference, holistic-risk engagement.185 Principle 7’s broader
nature betrays its provenance, which is to encourage greater consideration of
ESG factors by market participants, rather than holistic-risk engagement specif-
ically. Rather than, as currently required by the Code, focusing on disclosures
relating to issuer-specific engagement, that does not regularly occur in a mean-
ingful way, beneficiaries and clients would better benefit from more explicit
disclosures relating to holistic-risk engagement, which does occur in practice.
In particular, specific disclosures regarding which holistic risks are prioritised
and how they are factored into engagement would be valuable.Additionally, the
disclosure framework on holistic-risk engagement should be further developed
183 n 162, and accompanying text.
184 2020 Code, n 2 above, Principle 7 – Reporting Expectations: Context.
185 Principle 7 embraces a much broader aspiration than holistic-risk engagement, and urges insti-
tutional investors to integrate stewardship matters, such as ESG and climate change, into buy,
hold and exit decisions in alignment with the investment time horizons of beneficiaries.
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to specifically require disclosure by institutional investors as to how and in what
circumstances they will support holistic-risk mitigation measures proposed by
other investors. Similar to the proposals made above with respect to offensive
activist campaigns,186 such disclosure will give beneficiaries and clients clearer
information as to which holistic-risks are of concern to asset owners and asset
managers. In the bigger picture, even such disclosure by passive investors can be
instrumental, since if passive investors disclose that they will support judicious
proposals by other investors on certain holistic-risk issues, issuers will be more
likely to respond positively to engagement by other investors in the knowledge
that passive funds,with their increasing share of voting rights,187 will support the
relevant engagements.188 Active investors would, correspondingly, be encour-
aged to engage, and holistic-risk engagement should become more prevalent
across the market.
Even though Kingman has expressed scepticism that institutional investors
are engaging with issuers, in fact, holistic-risk engagement, which is arguably
more beneficial in the wider context than engagement on issuer-specific mat-
ters,may be alive and kicking.The FRC appears to have belatedly woken-up to
that understanding, and, as with disclosures related to the support of offensive
activist engagement discussed above, it is now time that any regulatory disclo-
sure requirements are tailored specifically to the types of engagement that will
actually take place.189
CONCLUSIONS
The 2020 Code is the first substantial up-date of the Stewardship Code since
its genesis in 2010, and it continues its mission to promote proactive issuer-
specific engagement by institutional investors on strategic issues as implored
by the Walker Review, and pursuant to the final warning to enhance effec-
tive engagement notified by the Kingman Review.However, the diversification
of portfolios by institutional investors, the competitive environment in which
186 See ‘Putting issuer-specific engagement into context’ above.
187 n 89 above.
188 Large asset managers engaging on an institutional basis will also significantly enhance the influ-
ence of holistic-risk engagement (n 173 above, and accompanying text).
189 The FRC is not the only regulatory body that has been enlightened in this regard – outside
the UK, the EU has implemented mandatory disclosure requirements, effective as of March
2021 (Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, n 82 above, Art 20), for ‘financial participants’, including
asset managers, insurance companies and occupational pension schemes (ibid, Art 2), to make
sustainability-risk related disclosures. A ‘sustainability-risk’ is ‘an environmental, social or gover-
nance event or condition that, if it occurs, could cause an actual or a potential material negative
impact on the value of the investment’ (ibid, Art 2), and disclosures are required in relation to
the extent to which sustainability risks are integrated into investment decision-making (ibid, Art
3(1)) (unless they are deemed not relevant in which case the reasons therefor must be disclosed),
and the likely impacts of sustainability risks on returns (ibid, Art 6(1)(b)). Although the EU’s
regulatory agenda stems from a desire to ensure that the financial system supports sustainability,
such as environmental goals, it is clear that the EU does not view holistic-risk engagement as
a lost cause, with an assumption that beneficiaries will encourage asset owners to exercise such
stewardship based upon disclosures that clearly link such engagement (or the lack thereof) to the
relevant portfolio’s financial returns.
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they exist, and the uncertainties surrounding the success of any proposed en-
gagement mean that issuer-specific engagement will rarely be in the interests
of asset owners or asset managers, or, importantly, given the duties owed by
them, in the interests of their beneficiaries and clients, respectively. No matter
the efforts of the Stewardship Code, institutional investors will seldom proac-
tively engage on issuer-specific matters other than on low-cost governance,
and disclosures in relation thereto are often superfluous. Even worse, contin-
ued coercion of institutional investors to conduct issuer-specific engagement
could simply escalate box-ticking governance or uninformed engagement that
potentially damages issuers. Although outside the scope of this article, the tra-
ditional forms of engagement coveted by the Walker and Kingman Reviews
will only proliferate if institutional investors are placed under mandatory legal
or regulatory impositions (rather than the voluntary soft-law encouragement
of the 2020 Code) such that all institutional investors are required to engage,
negating the competitive benefits of free-riding; but, even then, it is difficult to
envisage how such requirements would operate or be enforced in any practical
sense.
Disclosure relating to engagement is not, though, completely without merit,
and outside the realms of ‘Walker-recommended’ issuer-specific engagement,
the disclosure environment could be improved in two respects. Firstly, there
should be greater recognition that the principal actors with an incentive to
conduct issuer-specific engagement are offensive activists such as hedge funds.
Since they require support from other institutional investors, disclosure by all
such investors as to how, and when, they will support activist campaigns would
be salutary. Second, there should be greater focus on ensuring that institutional
investors disclose which systemic and market-wide risks they consider impor-
tant and how they are manifested in real-world engagement. Unlike issuer-
specific engagement, incentives exist for institutional investors to engage on
such holistic risks, and related disclosure will be beneficial to both clients and
beneficiaries.
Critically, issuer-specific engagement by offensive activists and holistic-risk
engagement by active investors will generally occur whether or not encouraged
by the Stewardship Code, and, in fact, the Code will have very little impact
on whether or to what extent such engagement actually occurs. Instead, the
Code’s future approach, if it is not too late, should be to ensure that disclosures
are made by institutional investors in relation to the types of engagement
they exercise or support in a manner that will be informative to potential
beneficiaries and clients. Whether the Stewardship Code is the appropriate
forum for such requirements is a discussion for another day, but, notably, in
the EU, disclosure requirements related to stewardship are taking on more of a
mandatory character.190 However, taking the 2020 Code on its face, it is diffi-
cult to see how it will encourage further engagement in the manner requested
by the Kingman Review, and its broader focus unveils an acknowledgment by
the FRC that the 2020 Code is grappling for greater relevance in the face of
a losing battle to encourage more issuer-specific engagement by institutional
190 nn 82 and 189 above.
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investors. Eventually, the emperor’s subjects were no longer fooled by invisible
clothes; in the same way, there has been a dawning realisation that attempting
to use soft law to compel institutional investors to take actions that do not
correlate with their duties and commercial interests is an illusory endeavour,
and it is now time to focus on the types of engagement that actually occur.
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